Merleau-Ponty, Embodied Cognition and Enactivism
Between Phenomenology and the Life Sciences
Format:Hardback
Publisher:Edinburgh University Press
Publishing:30th Nov '26
£100.00
This title is due to be published on 30th November, and will be despatched as soon as possible.
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological work on embodiment and perception, Jack Reynolds develops a novel account of many of the recent debates in enactivism and embodied cognition, engaging specifically with the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of these views. Reynolds sets out a Merleau-Ponty inspired view of enactive cognition, arguing that it presents the best overall explanation of both phenomenological considerations and a range of scientific evidence concerning life and mind. He defends the view against a variety of alternative positions across the putative analytic-continental divide, including predictive processing, illusionism and computationalism.
A thorough and original re-examination of Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the light of his contribution to contemporary debates on 4E cognition. Essential reading for anyone wishing to understand what the philosophy of mind owes to Merleau-Ponty and what aspects of his thought remain relevant to contemporary thinking. -- Claude Romano, Sorbonne University
Despite Merleau-Ponty’s important contributions to the development of embodied and enactive approaches to cognition, Reynolds reminds us that there are still significant insights to be found in his analyses (relevant to contemporary debates about abduction and science, post-genomic biology, autonomy, naturalism and realism). In effect, Reynolds reminds us not by looking back, but by using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology as a framework for understanding the most recent research in a way that further contributes to the ongoing debates about embodied-enactive perspectives. -- Shaun Gallagher, University of Memphis
ISBN: 9781399539852
Dimensions: unknown
Weight: unknown
288 pages